Current State of the Dairy Industry by Brown, D. Scott (Douglas Scott), 1964-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement by Scott Brown 
 
Dairy Economist for the 
 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the 
 
University of Missouri 
 
Before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on 
 
Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition and Forestry 
 
Tuesday, May 20, 2003 
 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here 
today to discuss the current state of the dairy industry.  My remarks will focus on how 
policy, trade, and supply and demand factors have been important in determining today’s 
market situation for the dairy industry.  In my remarks today, I will not condone nor 
condemn any of the current policies in place in the dairy industry.  The institute that I am 
a part of, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) strives to remain 
an unbiased, objective unit that stands ready to provide Congress with a quantitative 
assessment of any agricultural policy alternative. 
 
The dairy industry is experiencing some of the lowest milk prices since the late 1970s.  
USDA’s preliminary estimate of the April all milk price is $10.90 per cwt.  This is a 
decline of over $1.50 per cwt relative to the year earlier level, and more than $2.00 per 
cwt relative to the past five-year or ten-year average for April.  Many factors are 
responsible for the current milk price situation.  Demand for dairy products has been soft 
since late 2001 due in part to weaker general economic outlook than many experts had 
expected.  Commercial disappearance on a milkfat basis grew only 0.5 percent in 2002 
while on a skim solids basis disappearance actually fell by 0.3 percent.  Although there 
may be some signs that demand for dairy products is starting to turn around, commercial 
stocks of dairy products will need to be drawn down before prices can rise. 
 
The supply side of the picture has also contributed to low milk prices.  Milk production 
expanded by 2.7 percent in 2002 in response to the $15 per cwt annual average milk price 
received in 2001.  Thus far in 2003, milk cows have remained near 9.15 million head and 
have yet to contract in response to the current low milk prices. 
 
Although dairy product trade has caught the attention of many in the dairy industry, 
changes in the trade picture are not a major factor in the current outlook situation.  
Imports of milk protein concentrates probably have displaced some domestic nonfat dry 
milk use but it has not had a large negative impact on milk prices.  Further research is 
needed to understand some of the functionality issues that result in the use of milk protein 
concentrates instead of nonfat dry milk in some food products. 
 
Current FAPRI projections would suggest that milk prices will rebound in the second half 
of 2003 but will remain low by historical standards.  Recent increases in dairy cow 
slaughter should begin to impact milk supplies in the coming months and allow for some 
strength in milk prices.  Sustained growth in dairy product demand would also provide a 
boost for milk prices.  
 
With respect to some of the longer-term market and policy issues, FAPRI has recently 
completed a broad examination of current federal dairy policy in a report attached to my 
testimony.  The research examines the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program, the 
dairy price support program, the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) and Federal 
Milk Market Orders (FMMOs).  The “corners” approach taken in this research helps to 
frame the debate about the impact of federal dairy policies. 
 
The MILC program has received considerable attention in the wake of recent low milk 
prices.  Some have argued that the MILC program is responsible for the current milk 
price declines.  It is clear that the MILC program does lower milk prices as producers 
respond to the additional payments made under the program.  However, the current 
FAPRI estimate shows the all milk price would be only $0.25 per cwt higher in 2003 in 
the absence of the MILC program suggesting that much of the current decline in milk 
prices is due to factors other than the MILC program. In terms of the current outlook, the 
MILC program likely prolongs adjustment in milk supplies to the current low milk prices. 
 
To date, over $1.3 billion has been sent to milk producers under the MILC program.  
Current FAPRI estimates suggest that during the life of the MILC program outlays will 
reach $4.8 billion. With the 2.4 million pound marketings cap on payments, the MILC 
program benefits small dairy producers.  This benefit can be seen in the state-by-state 
MILC outlays, as nearly 20 percent of total MILC outlays have gone to Wisconsin 
producers whose milk production represents 13 percent of the nation’s milk supply. 
Alternatively, California producers have received 8 percent of total MILC outlays while 
producing 21 percent of the nation’s milk supply.  Current NASS estimates show that the 
average dairy herd in Wisconsin has just over 70 cows while in California the average 
dairy herd is over 650 cows. 
 
The MILC program has offsetting effects on producer income.  On one hand, producers 
benefit from the direct government payments they receive on up to 2.4 million pounds of 
milk marketed when Boston class I prices fall below $16.94 per cwt.  On the other hand, 
producers are hurt as increased milk supplies caused by the MILC program reduce milk 
prices.  For large producers, the decline in the market price for milk outweighs the MILC 
payment they receive on their first 2.4 million pounds while for smaller producers the 
MILC program payment more than offsets the decline in the market price of milk.  Using 
the FAPRI aggregate analysis of the MILC program, Agriculture Food and Policy Center 
(AFPC) researchers at Texas A&M University suggest that until a dairy operation reaches 
about 600 head, the benefits of the MILC program exceed the loss from lower milk prices 
that result from the MILC program. 
 
The FAPRI analysis of an expanded MILC program that covers every pound of milk 
produced shows that the market effects of such a program could be quite large.  Milk 
prices could decline by over $1 per cwt under such a program and government outlays 
under the program could top $2.5 billion annually.  The analysis of this this program 
alternative suggests that the parameters under which the MILC program operates are 
critical.  Perhaps even more important is the compatibility of different aspects of federal 
dairy policy.  The MILC program and price support program can create a chronic 
problem for the dairy industry if parameters of these programs are set at levels that 
encourage long term surplus production of milk.   
 
The dairy price support program has been a key component of dairy policy for many 
years.  If the price support program is eliminated, FAPRI analysis suggests that in the 
short run milk prices would decline by nearly $0.40 per cwt.  Longer term milk prices 
return to baseline levels as milk production adjusts to elimination of the program.  The 
analysis results of this feature of federal dairy policy rest on how the Secretary of 
Agriculture chooses to eliminate government owned dairy products and the level of  
world market prices of dairy products. 
 
Although FAPRI analysis shows only small effects of eliminating the price support 
program after the first two years, it is important to note that the current price support 
program does provide a safety net in circumstances where milk supplies exceed demand 
needs.  This can be critical in a market where demand for the product is rather inelastic. 
  
Changes in the federal milk marketing order system dominated much of the dairy policy 
debate of the late 1990s.  Further modifications to the federal order system continue to be 
debated by the industry.  These debates focus on both the number of orders and classes of 
milk needed in the federal order system.  Any quantitative analysis that looks at large 
changes in the federal order system remains difficult to conduct.  Data limitations require 
large assumptions to be made in an attempt to quantify the impact of the change in 
federal orders.  FAPRI analysis that looks at complete elimination of the federal order 
system highlights the regional battles that will unfold as federal order changes are made. 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to address these critical issues for the dairy industry.  I 
look forward to answering your questions.  
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The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) has provided Congress 
quantitative analysis of policy alternatives since the 1980s.  The majority of the FAPRI analysis 
has been conducted on a particular policy alternative under consideration as Congress debate 
farm policy change.  Focusing on the quantitative effect of one policy alternative does not allow 
for a broader view of the effect that an entire set of policies has on an agricultural sector. 
 
The objective of this work is to provide a layer-by-layer dissection of the effect that each current 
major federal dairy policies has on the dairy industry.  This approach allows for the measurement 
of both the effect of one piece of current policy and the effect that combinations of current policy 
have on the dairy industry.  The major features of dairy policy analyzed are the Milk Income 
Loss Contract (MILC) program, the dairy price support program, the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP), and Federal Milk Market Orders (FMMOs).  This analysis does not cover any 
changes in state-level dairy regulations that are currently in place. 
 
The scenarios shown in this analysis should not be interpreted as likely outcomes for dairy policy 
change.  In many cases, these scenarios represent “end points” or “corners” of policy choices.  
They are meant to frame the debate for a particular policy option. 
 
These policy alternatives are run with the FAPRI dairy model that is documented in FAPRI-
UMC TDR # 01-03.  The FAPRI dairy model is a set of over 350 structural equations that 
attempt to capture the important economic relationships that exist in the U.S. dairy sector.  The 
supply side of the model is handled at the state-level while the demand portion of the model is 
national. 
 
FAPRI Dairy Baseline 
 
The analysis will be a forward-looking examination (2003-2012) of what the dairy industry may 
look like if each of the regulations that are the focus of this work is removed.  The yardstick that 
will be used to measure the effect of eliminating these policies is the March 2003 FAPRI 
baseline.   A full description of the domestic baseline covering many agricultural commodities 
can be found in the “FAPRI 2003 U.S. Baseline Briefing Book,” FAPRI-UMC Technical Data 
Report 04-03, March 2003.  This report can be found on the FAPRI website at 
www.fapri.missouri.edu. 
 
The domestic dairy baseline is driven in part by expected feed prices and information about the 
general economic outlook.  Equally important to the baseline for the domestic dairy industry are 
assumptions related to current policy.  The March baseline assumes that the price support 
program and FMMOs remain in place for the life of the baseline.  The MILC program expires 
September 30, 2005, as legislated in the 2002 farm bill, and is capped at a producer’s first 2.4 
million pounds of marketings.  The baseline assumes that producers do not reorganize their 
operations to qualify more of their milk for the MILC program.  This leads to a baseline 
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assumption that 58.5 percent of the milk produced in the U.S. is eligible for MILC payments.  
The percentage of milk eligible for MILC payments varies greatly on a state-level basis.  This 
baseline assumes full use of the DEIP for nonfat dry milk but no DEIP use in cheese or butter 
markets.  Current import trade restrictions remain in place throughout the baseline.  This baseline 
assumes no butter/non fat dry milk tilts will occur in support prices for these products. 
 
An overview of the dairy baseline is shown in Table 1.   This baseline projects that U.S. all milk 
prices remain at or below $13 per cwt. during the baseline.  The baseline shows that milk prices 
increase at a faster pace after the MILC program ends.  Milk prices are projected to grow slower 
than previous baselines primarily as a result of the slower growth in domestic cheese 
consumption projected in this baseline.  Nonfat dry milk prices remain at the government 
purchase price throughout the baseline as government stocks of nonfat dry milk remain 
burdensome.  Both butter and cheese prices increase over the baseline as growth in demand for 
those products remains slightly ahead of the growth in supply.  Government outlays for the dairy 
industry are expected to top $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 as retroactive payments under the 
MILC program and many of the 2003 MILC payments fall in fiscal 2003.  The annual cost of the 
MILC program is expected to average $1.5 billion.  
 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dairy Cows (thou. head) 9,067 9,011 8,965 8,896 8,841 8,801 8,768 8,741 8,718 8,700
Milk Yield (lbs.) 18,884 19,179 19,462 19,714 19,991 20,268 20,534 20,791 21,043 21,291
Milk Production (bil. lbs.) 171.2 172.8 174.5 175.4 176.7 178.4 180.0 181.7 183.5 185.2
All Milk Price ($/cwt.) 12.19 12.24 12.27 12.52 12.58 12.71 12.73 12.81 12.91 13.00
MILC Payment ($/cwt.) 1.22 1.18 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Class III Price ($/cwt.) 10.98 11.07 11.11 11.37 11.45 11.59 11.63 11.73 11.85 11.96
Class IV Price ($/cwt.) 10.49 10.50 10.55 10.85 10.91 11.06 11.06 11.12 11.20 11.26
Cheese Price ($/lb.) 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.31 1.33 1.34
Butter Price ($/lb.) 1.19 1.25 1.26 1.33 1.35 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.43
Nonfat Dry Milk Price ($/lb.) 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
Per Capita Consumption (lbs.)
   Cheese 30.1 30.5 30.8 31.0 31.2 31.4 31.7 32.0 32.3 32.5
   Butter 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3
   Nonfat Dry Milk 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6
   Fluid 207.8 207.9 207.5 206.4 205.3 204.3 203.7 203.2 202.9 202.5
Net Removals (mil. lbs.)
   Nonfat Dry Milk 457 367 341 292 267 268 250 228 206 187
Gov't Outlays (mil. $, fiscal year) 2,586.4  1,524.4  1,501.3  579.9     268.0     271.9     259.9     244.1     226.5     210.0     
   MILC Program 2,205.8  1,200.9  1,188.4  296.6     -        -        -        -        -        -        
   Other 380.6     323.5     313.0     283.2     268.0     271.9     259.9     244.1     226.5     210.0     
Table 1. Summary of the FAPRI March 2003 Dairy Baseline
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MILC Program 
 
 
The first piece of dairy policy examined is the MILC program.  To provide a broader view of the 
impacts of the MILC program, three separate scenarios are included.  The first scenario (MILC) 
extends the MILC program for the life of the baseline.  The second scenario (MILC+) extends 
the MILC program for the life of the baseline and removes the 2.4 million pound cap on 
producer marketings eligible for the payment.  The final scenario (No MILC) is elimination of 
the MILC program. 
 
It is important to recognize that the assumed participation rates used in the baseline are crucial in 
determining how states fare under the alternatives shown here.  The actual level of participation 
in each state remains unclear.  Although some data is beginning to surface regarding state-level 
MILC program payments, it is by no means final.  For example, some potential participants have 
not signed up yet recognizing they will still be eligible for retroactive payments under the 
program.  The assumption that 58.5 percent of milk marketed in the United States is eligible for a 
direct payment results from summing eligible milk in each of the major states.  The early data 
recently available would suggest U.S. participation to date is less than assumed in the baseline.  
The amount of eligible milk in each state was calculated by looking at the size of operation 
information contained in milk production reports.  This approach in determining participation is 
not exact.  The assumption of the percent of milk eligible for a direct payment in each state is: 
California, 17; Wisconsin, 85; New York, 77; Pennsylvania, 90; Minnesota, 85; Idaho, 24; New 
Mexico, 8; Michigan, 70; Washington, 29; and Texas, 47.  The baseline assumes no reduction in 
each states eligible milk percentage over time even though continued structural change would 
suggest a reduction should occur.  On the other side of the equation is the notion that over time 
additional leakage around the 2.4 million pound cap could occur. 
 
The three scenarios chosen to examine the MILC program provide a broad examination of the 
program’s effects.  The MILC scenario provides an examination of the longer run impact of the 
current program since the baseline only has the MILC program in place through September 30, 
2005.  The MILC+ scenario allows analysis of a program that behaves quite differently from the 
current MILC program since there is no cap on eligible milk.  In addition, this scenario provides 
information on how the MILC program would affect the dairy industry if the 2.4 million pound 
marketings cap could be worked around through reorganization of producers’ operations.  The 
remaining scenario, NoMILC, shows how the industry would fare without the direct payment 
program. 
 
The aggregate results shown in Table 2 suggest that each of these scenarios has tradeoffs that 
occur depending on how much of producer revenue is derived from the market versus direct 
payments from the government.  Not surprisingly, the largest level of milk supplies occurs under 
the MILC+ scenario.  This result occurs because the government is making direct payments on 
all milk marketed which gives the largest net revenue increase.  In addition, the MILC+ run 
shows the largest level of government outlays, averaging $2.8 billion per year over the 2008 to 
2012 period. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the NoMILC scenario.  This scenario results in the lowest 
level of milk production and the lowest level of government outlays.  Over the 2008 to 2012 
period, government outlays under this option average only $0.2 billion per year.  This cost is 
associated with running the price support program and the DEIP.  Milk production averages 200 
million pounds below the baseline over the 2008 to 2012 period. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
Milk Production (bil. lbs.)
Baseline 171.2 172.8 174.5 175.4 176.7 178.4 180.0 181.7 183.5 185.2 174.1 181.8
MILC 171.2 172.8 174.5 176.2 177.9 179.7 181.5 183.2 185.0 186.7 174.5 183.2
   ∆ From Base 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.4 1.4
MILC+ 172.0 173.9 175.8 177.6 179.4 181.3 183.2 184.9 186.6 188.3 175.8 184.9
   ∆ From Base 0.8 1.1 1.3 2.3 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 1.6 3.1
   ∆ From MILC 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.7
No MILC 170.3 171.7 173.1 174.7 176.3 178.1 179.8 181.6 183.4 185.2 173.2 181.6
   ∆ From Base -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.2
   ∆ From MILC -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6
   ∆ From MILC+ -1.7 -2.2 -2.6 -2.9 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -2.5 -3.3
All Milk Price ($/cwt.)
Baseline 12.19 12.24 12.27 12.52 12.58 12.71 12.73 12.81 12.91 13.00 12.36 12.83
MILC 12.19 12.24 12.27 12.28 12.22 12.28 12.26 12.32 12.41 12.50 12.24 12.36
   ∆ From Base 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.24 -0.36 -0.43 -0.47 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.12 -0.48
MILC+ 11.96 11.89 11.85 11.80 11.71 11.74 11.71 11.75 11.85 11.95 11.84 11.80
   ∆ From Base -0.23 -0.35 -0.42 -0.72 -0.88 -0.97 -1.03 -1.06 -1.06 -1.05 -0.52 -1.04
   ∆ From MILC -0.23 -0.35 -0.42 -0.48 -0.52 -0.54 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.55 -0.40 -0.56
No MILC 12.45 12.61 12.71 12.75 12.73 12.81 12.80 12.86 12.95 13.02 12.65 12.89
   ∆ From Base 0.25 0.37 0.44 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.29 0.05
   ∆ From MILC 0.25 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.41 0.53
   ∆ From MILC+ 0.49 0.72 0.86 0.95 1.02 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.08 0.81 1.09
MILC Payment ($/cwt.) a/
Baseline 1.22 1.18 1.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.71 0.00
MILC 1.22 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.17 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.05 1.00 1.18 1.08
   ∆ From Base 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 1.17 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.46 1.08
MILC+ 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.39 1.36 1.37 1.34 1.29 1.23 1.35 1.32
   ∆ From Base 0.10 0.15 0.18 1.35 1.39 1.36 1.37 1.34 1.29 1.23 0.63 1.32
   ∆ From MILC 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.24
No MILC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   ∆ From Base -1.22 -1.18 -1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.71 0.00
   ∆ From MILC -1.22 -1.18 -1.16 -1.15 -1.17 -1.13 -1.13 -1.10 -1.05 -1.00 -1.18 -1.08
   ∆ From MILC+ -1.32 -1.33 -1.34 -1.35 -1.39 -1.36 -1.37 -1.34 -1.29 -1.23 -1.35 -1.32
Net Revenue ($/cwt.) b/
Baseline 12.91 12.93 12.95 12.52 12.58 12.71 12.73 12.81 12.91 13.00 12.78 12.83
MILC 12.91 12.93 12.95 12.95 12.90 12.95 12.92 12.96 13.02 13.08 12.93 12.99
   ∆ From Base 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.32 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.15
MILC+ 13.28 13.22 13.19 13.15 13.09 13.10 13.07 13.09 13.13 13.18 13.19 13.12
   ∆ From Base 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.63 0.51 0.39 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.41 0.28
   ∆ From MILC 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.13
No MILC 12.45 12.61 12.71 12.75 12.73 12.81 12.80 12.86 12.95 13.02 12.65 12.89
   ∆ From Base -0.46 -0.32 -0.24 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.13 0.05
   ∆ From MILC -0.46 -0.32 -0.24 -0.20 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.28 -0.10
   ∆ From MILC+ -0.83 -0.61 -0.48 -0.40 -0.36 -0.30 -0.27 -0.23 -0.19 -0.16 -0.54 -0.23
Government Outlays (mil $, fiscal year)
Baseline 2,586 1,524 1,501 580 268 272 260 244 226 210 1,292 242
MILC 2,586 1,524 1,501 1,498 1,516 1,515 1,512 1,483 1,427 1,366 1,725 1,461
   ∆ From Base 0 0 0 919 1,247 1,243 1,252 1,239 1,200 1,156 433 1,218
MILC+ 3,399 2,664 2,709 2,758 2,831 2,852 2,871 2,844 2,761 2,665 2,872 2,799
   ∆ From Base 813 1,140 1,207 2,178 2,563 2,580 2,612 2,600 2,535 2,455 1,580 2,556
   ∆ From MILC 813 1,140 1,207 1,259 1,316 1,337 1,359 1,360 1,335 1,299 1,147 1,338
No MILC 1,639 281 264 257 249 258 251 237 222 207 538 235
   ∆ From Base -947 -1,243 -1,237 -323 -19 -14 -9 -7 -5 -3 -754 -8
   ∆ From MILC -947 -1,243 -1,237 -1,242 -1,266 -1,257 -1,261 -1,246 -1,205 -1,159 -1,187 -1,226
   ∆ From MILC+ -1,760 -2,383 -2,444 -2,501 -2,582 -2,594 -2,620 -2,606 -2,540 -2,458 -2,334 -2,564
Baseline - FAPRI March 2003 Baseline, MILC - Extend current MILC program through 2012, MILC+ - Extend MILC program through 
     2012 and pay on all milk marketed, No MILC - Eliminate the current MILC program 1/1/2003
a/ - Payment rate on eligible milk
b/ - Net revenue on all milk produced
Table 2. Summary of the Impacts of Alternative MILC Program Options on the U.S. Dairy Sector
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In between the MILC+ and NoMILC scenarios lies the MILC scenario.  The MILC scenario 
assumes that on a nationwide basis 58.5 percent of milk marketed is eligible for the MILC 
payment.  Government outlays under the MILC scenario average $1.5 billion per year over the 
2008 to 2012 period.  All milk prices average $0.50 per cwt. less under the MILC scenario than 
the baseline.  Over the 2008 to 2012 period, total average revenue under the MILC scenario is 
$0.15 higher than the baseline. 
 
Further examination of Table 2 shows that the short and long run effects of these alternative 
MILC program scenarios are different.  In 2003, the lowest net revenue occurs under the 
NoMILC scenario at $11.94 per cwt. while net revenue is the highest under the MILC+ scenario 
at $13.32 per cwt. That is a difference of $1.38 per cwt.  However, examination of the last year 
of the analysis shows that the net revenue difference between the highest and lowest is only 
$0.18 per cwt.  Although the MILC+ scenario shows the highest revenue, the baseline now has 
the lowest level of net revenue.  This reinforces the fact that in the short run, these kinds of 
programs can have markedly different aggregate impacts.  However, once milk supplies have 
had time to adjust, the aggregate impacts become muted.  
 
Perhaps more interesting than the aggregate results are the state-level impacts of the MILC 
program alternatives shown in Table 3.  The option that is most attractive to a particular state 
depends entirely on that state’s herd size.  Small herd states prefer a MILC option that caps direct 
payments while large-herd states like the option that does not have a production cap on direct 
payments or the option of no direct payments.  The first section of Table 3 presents the level of 
revenue for the baseline (the all milk price in the state plus any direct payment averaged across 
all milk marketed in the state).  The remaining three sections of Table 3 provide the change in 
net revenue relative to the baseline.  In 2012, California net revenue is highest under the MILC+ 
scenario and lowest under the MILC scenario while Wisconsin revenue is highest under the 
MILC scenario and lowest under the baseline.    
 
The regional effect of these MILC scenarios is further illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.  These 
graphics provide the short (2003-2007) and long (2008-2012) run effect of each MILC program 
scenario on Wisconsin, California, and U.S. net revenue.  It is clear that California enjoys the 
highest revenue under the MILC+ scenario in both the short and long run.  Even in the long run, 
however, the higher direct payments are being eroded away by lower milk prices.  In the short 
run, Wisconsin is only slightly better off under the MILC scenario relative to the MILC+ 
scenario but is clearly better off in the long run under the MILC scenario relative to any of the 
other scenarios.  At the U.S. level, the highest revenue in the short run is found in the MILC+ 
scenario.  However, in the long run, the difference between scenarios is narrowing, although the 
MILC+ scenario is still showing the highest net revenue. 
 
It is informative to note that even when the MILC program is extended to cover all milk, the 
market, as measured by all milk prices, is responsible for 90 percent of revenue while the MILC 
direct payment makes up the remaining 10 percent.  The fact that the direct payment formula 
returns only 40 percent of the difference between $16.94 per cwt. and the Boston class I price 
keeps the amount of revenue provided by the government at a much lower level than if the full 
difference was paid. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
Baseline (Revenue Level)
California 11.09 11.13 11.17 11.24 11.30 11.44 11.47 11.55 11.65 11.73 11.19 11.57
Wisconsin 13.45 13.50 13.52 12.80 12.88 13.02 13.06 13.16 13.28 13.38 13.23 13.18
New York 13.80 13.83 13.86 13.23 13.31 13.45 13.49 13.58 13.69 13.78 13.61 13.60
Pennsylvania 14.89 14.92 14.94 14.17 14.24 14.39 14.42 14.51 14.62 14.72 14.63 14.53
Minnesota 13.52 13.57 13.60 12.87 12.95 13.10 13.14 13.23 13.35 13.46 13.30 13.25
Idaho 11.74 11.79 11.83 11.82 11.90 12.04 12.08 12.17 12.28 12.38 11.82 12.19
New Mexico 11.92 11.99 12.03 12.21 12.29 12.43 12.47 12.56 12.68 12.78 12.09 12.59
Michigan 13.13 13.18 13.21 12.66 12.73 12.88 12.91 13.01 13.12 13.22 12.98 13.03
Washington 12.48 12.53 12.56 12.50 12.57 12.72 12.74 12.83 12.94 13.03 12.53 12.85
Texas 13.45 13.50 13.54 13.26 13.34 13.48 13.52 13.61 13.72 13.82 13.42 13.63
Other States 13.45 13.50 13.52 12.98 13.06 13.20 13.24 13.33 13.44 13.54 13.30 13.35
MILC (∆ in Revenue relative to Baseline)
California 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.17 -0.24 -0.28 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.04 -0.30
Wisconsin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.63 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.27 0.44
New York 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.53 0.43 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.34
Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.68 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.42 0.38 0.29 0.48
Minnesota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.63 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.27 0.44
Idaho 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.17 -0.21 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.01 -0.24
New Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.28 -0.35 -0.39 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 -0.09 -0.40
Michigan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.27
Washington 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.04 -0.12 -0.17 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 0.01 -0.19
Texas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.02
Other States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.45 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.26
MILC+ (∆ in Revenue relative to Baseline)
California 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.64 0.52 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.72 0.30
Wisconsin 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.65 0.53 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.30
New York 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.62 0.50 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.26
Pennsylvania -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.62 0.50 0.38 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.27
Minnesota 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.66 0.53 0.42 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.31
Idaho 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.65 0.27
New Mexico 1.00 0.90 0.84 0.64 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.78 0.29
Michigan 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.64 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.33 0.28
Washington 0.72 0.62 0.57 0.60 0.47 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.60 0.23
Texas 0.52 0.43 0.38 0.64 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.50 0.28
Other States 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.63 0.51 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.28
No MILC (∆ in Revenue relative to Baseline)
California 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.05
Wisconsin -0.78 -0.64 -0.55 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.32 0.05
New York -0.68 -0.53 -0.45 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.25 0.06
Pennsylvania -0.84 -0.69 -0.60 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.35 0.06
Minnesota -0.78 -0.64 -0.55 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.32 0.05
Idaho -0.03 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.06
New Mexico 0.16 0.28 0.35 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.05
Michigan -0.60 -0.46 -0.38 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.21 0.05
Washington -0.08 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.06
Texas -0.32 -0.18 -0.10 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.05
Other States -0.59 -0.45 -0.37 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.20 0.06
Baseline - FAPRI March 2003 Baseline, MILC - Extend current MILC program through 2012, MILC+ - Extend MILC program through 
     2012 and pay on all milk marketed, No MILC - Eliminate the current MILC program 1/1/2003
Table 3. The Regional Impacts on Revenue of Alternative MILC Program Options
($/cwt.)
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Figure 1. Revenue Effects of the MILC Program, 2003-2007 Average
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Figure 2. Revenue Effects of the MILC Program, 2008-2012 Average
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Price Support Program and DEIP Elimination 
  
 
This section will explore the effects on the dairy sector of eliminating the price support program 
and the DEIP.  These alternatives are compared to the NoMILC scenario as this research 
continues to peal away each layer of federal dairy policy.  The yardstick against which these 
scenarios are compared is important.  The outlook for the dairy sector suggests that nonfat dry 
milk will continue to be in surplus for several years yet the government does not accumulate any 
stocks of other dairy products.  If demand for nonfat solids would be larger than shown here or 
demand for butterfat weaker, this analysis would show different effects as these programs are 
eliminated.  Similarly, the baseline assumes full use of the DEIP for nonfat dry milk, but no use 
in cheese or butter.   
 
Two assumptions dealing with the world price outlook for butter and nonfat dry milk are needed 
to look at the scenarios in this section.  World nonfat dry milk prices are assumed to be the 
average of the 1990 to 2000 level less $0.10 per lb. for transportation.  That puts a floor on U.S. 
nonfat dry milk prices of $0.68 per lb.  Likewise, world butter prices are assumed to equal their 
1990 to 2000 average.  Once the tariff is added to the world butter price, it suggests that 
additional butter imports would enter the United States once the U.S. butter price exceeds $1.50 
per lb.  These assumptions oversimplify the linkages and dynamics that exist in global dairy 
markets. 
 
One final assumption is needed concerning the release of large quantities of nonfat dry milk 
stocks held by the government.  This analysis assumes that in 2003 and 2004 300 million pounds 
of nonfat dry milk held by the government is eliminated with no market effect.  The remaining 
government-held inventory is assumed to enter the market equally in 2003 and 2004.  This is one 
of numerous ways the government could dispose of nonfat dry milk in storage. 
 
The outcome of these scenarios is summarized in Table 4.  Both of these scenarios have the 
largest impact on nonfat dry milk markets.  Table 4 provides the level results for the NoMILC, 
NoMILC/CCC, and NoMILC/CCC/DEIP.  The comparison to the NoMILC scenario is used so 
that the impact of eliminating the support price program and DEIP can be isolated.  The 
NoMILC/CCC scenario ends the price support program at the beginning of 2003 while the 
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP eliminates the price support program and the DEIP at the start of 2003. 
 
Under the NoMILC/CCC scenario, the first two years of the scenario show the largest changes as 
the government gets out of the stock-holding business.  Although this research assumes that 300 
million pounds of nonfat dry milk held by the government never reaches commercial markets in 
the first two years of the analysis, the government could choose to not let any nonfat dry milk 
held in government inventory reach commercial markets and that would minimize the effect of 
eliminating the price support program.  An additional 700 million pounds of nonfat dry milk 
enters the market in 2003 under the NoMILC/CCC scenario.  Domestic nonfat dry milk prices 
fall to world prices and the United States is able to commercially export 193 million pounds of 
nonfat dry milk.  Nonfat dry milk production declines by 223 million pounds, leaving the 
balance of the additional nonfat dry milk to be domestically consumed.  
 
A similar story can be told for the 2004 results.  After 2004, all government inventory of nonfat 
dry milk is gone.  That leaves a much smaller amount of nonfat dry milk that must enter 
domestic markets.  For example, in 2008 an additional 106 million pounds of nonfat dry milk 
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that was removed under the NoMILC scenario now ends up in commercial channels, 14% 
compared to the 2003 level. 
 
The NoMILC/CCC/DEIP scenario shows similar directional results, only larger magnitudes.  In 
the first two years of the analysis, eliminating the DEIP only causes switching of DEIP product 
to commercial exports.  However, the NoMILC/CCC/DEIP scenario keeps nonfat dry milk 
prices lower in the out-years of the analysis since domestic prices are too high to allow the 
formerly subsidized product to move as commercially exported product. 
 
As less milk is produced under both of the scenarios relative to the NoMILC scenario, less fat is 
available to churn into butter.  That causes butter prices to rise to the point that additional 
imports enter the U.S.  In 2004 under the NoMILC/CCC/DEIP scenario, an additional 75 million 
pounds of butter enters the U.S. 
 
Cheese markets experience an increase in production in the early years of both scenarios as milk 
supplies are diverted away from nonfat dry milk and butter markets.  Cheese prices are $0.05 per 
pound lower than the NoMILC scenario during the first two years.  Once milk supplies adjust, 
cheese prices approach the NoMILC levels. 
 
All milk prices are $0.40 to $0.45 per cwt lower the first two years under both scenarios.  
However, beginning in 2005 all milk prices return to the baseline in the NoCCC scenario as they 
are propped up by higher butter prices.  Under the NoCCC/DEIP scenario all milk prices remain 
below the NoMILC scenario as nonfat dry milk and cheese prices remain below the NoMILC 
scenario.  Milk supplies adjust down under both of these scenarios.  In 2012 under the 
NoCCC/DEIP scenario, milk production is 1.2 billion pounds less than under the NoMILC 
scenario.  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
Nonfat Dry Milk Net Removals (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 418 314 280 259 244 251 239 220 200 183 303 219
   NoMILC/CCC -285 -485 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 -67 145
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP -430 -630 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -212 0
Nonfat Dry Milk Production (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 1,433   1,364   1,348   1,341   1,339   1,362   1,362   1,359   1,357   1,357   1,365          1,359           
   NoMILC/CCC 1,210   1,106   1,287   1,292   1,301   1,321   1,330   1,340   1,350   1,360   1,239          1,340           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 1,210   1,106   1,167   1,170   1,177   1,193   1,206   1,215   1,225   1,236   1,166          1,215           
Nonfat Dry Milk Commerical Exports (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -              -              
   NoMILC/CCC 193      264      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      91               -              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 338      409      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      149             -              
Butter Production (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 1,314   1,292   1,292   1,293   1,292   1,306   1,306   1,306   1,305   1,304   1,297          1,305           
   NoMILC/CCC 1,241   1,195   1,274   1,277   1,281   1,293   1,297   1,300   1,302   1,305   1,253          1,299           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 1,241   1,195   1,224   1,226   1,228   1,238   1,244   1,246   1,249   1,251   1,222          1,245           
Butter Imports (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 32        32        32        32        34        36        38        40        42        44        32               40               
   NoMILC/CCC 75        32        64        107      37        32        34        36        38        40        63               36               
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 64        107      82        82        84        90        86        88        90        92        84               89               
Cheese Production (mil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 8,397   8,576   8,719   8,876   9,039   9,190   9,357   9,522   9,688   9,855   8,721          9,522           
   NoMILC/CCC 8,489   8,656   8,697   8,869   9,034   9,191   9,358   9,520   9,684   9,849   8,749          9,520           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 8,489   8,656   8,748   8,902   9,061   9,215   9,376   9,538   9,700   9,865   8,771          9,539           
Nonfat Dry Milk Price ($/lb.)
   NoMILC 0.84     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.82            0.81            
   NoMILC/CCC 0.68     0.68     0.78     0.78     0.79     0.78     0.79     0.80     0.81     0.82     0.74            0.80            
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 0.68     0.68     0.73     0.74     0.75     0.75     0.75     0.76     0.77     0.78     0.71            0.76            
Butter Price ($/lb.)
   NoMILC 1.27     1.36     1.39     1.40     1.39     1.42     1.41     1.42     1.43     1.44     1.36            1.42            
   NoMILC/CCC 1.51     1.53     1.50     1.50     1.47     1.49     1.47     1.46     1.45     1.44     1.50            1.46            
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 1.51     1.53     1.53     1.53     1.51     1.53     1.52     1.51     1.50     1.49     1.52            1.51            
Cheese Price ($/lb.)
   NoMILC 1.27     1.28     1.29     1.30     1.30     1.31     1.31     1.32     1.33     1.34     1.29            1.32            
   NoMILC/CCC 1.22     1.23     1.30     1.31     1.30     1.31     1.31     1.32     1.33     1.34     1.27            1.32            
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 1.22     1.23     1.27     1.28     1.29     1.29     1.30     1.31     1.32     1.33     1.26            1.31            
Class III Price ($/cwt.)
   NoMILC 11.23   11.42   11.53   11.59   11.59   11.69   11.70   11.78   11.89   11.99   11.47          11.81           
   NoMILC/CCC 10.82   10.97   11.64   11.70   11.66   11.72   11.72   11.81   11.92   12.02   11.36          11.84           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 10.82   10.97   11.37   11.48   11.50   11.58   11.63   11.72   11.84   11.95   11.23          11.74           
Class IV Price ($/cwt.)
   NoMILC 10.81   10.95   11.08   11.13   11.09   11.18   11.15   11.18   11.24   11.28   11.01          11.21           
   NoMILC/CCC 10.40   10.49   11.28   11.28   11.20   11.24   11.20   11.23   11.29   11.33   10.93          11.26           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 10.40   10.49   10.95   11.03   11.02   11.09   11.10   11.14   11.21   11.26   10.78          11.16           
All Milk Price ($/cwt.)
   NoMILC 12.45   12.61   12.71   12.75   12.73   12.81   12.80   12.86   12.95   13.02   12.65          12.89           
   NoMILC/CCC 12.04   12.15   12.83   12.86   12.80   12.84   12.83   12.89   12.98   13.06   12.54          12.92           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 12.04   12.15   12.55   12.64   12.64   12.70   12.73   12.80   12.90   12.98   12.40          12.82           
Milk Production (bil. lbs.)
   NoMILC 170.3   171.7   173.1   174.7   176.3   178.1   179.8   181.6   183.4   185.2   173.2          181.6           
   NoMILC/CCC 169.5   170.3   172.4   174.2   175.9   177.8   179.6   181.4   183.2   185.1   172.4          181.4           
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 169.5   170.3   171.8   173.4   175.0   176.7   178.5   180.3   182.1   184.0   172.0          180.3           
NoMILC - Eliminate the current MILC program 1/1/2003, NoMILC/CCC - Eliminate the price support program 1/1/2003 in addtion to 
   MILC elimination, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP - Eliminate the price support program and the DEIP 1/1/2003 in addtion to MILC elimination
Table 4. Impact of the Elimination of the Price Support Program and the DEIP on the U.S. Dairy Sector
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Federal Order Elimination  
 
Elimination of the federal order system is a difficult task for the FAPRI dairy model or for that 
matter any model that is formed with data that has embedded in it the presence of the federal 
order system.  Some of the particulars of federal order elimination are likely lost in this 
quantitative assessment.  Hopefully, these results provide the directional impact of eliminating 
the federal order system. 
 
Many assumptions were necessary to conduct this portion of the analysis.  The first assumption 
deals with the pricing of milk used for purposes other than fluid consumption.  The analysis 
assumes that Class II, III, and IV milk prices are gone and one market-clearing price replaces 
them.  The alternatives that could replace the classified minimum prices are endless.  This 
analysis assumes that the manufacturing price will be the average of the Class III and IV price 
formulas.  This price will be used for all manufacturing uses. 
 
This analysis looked at two alternatives for fluid milk prices under elimination of federal orders.  
The first scenario, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO, assumes that fluid premiums will exist without 
orders and average, nationally, $0.50 per cwt. over the manufacturing price.  These premiums are 
not the same across states but follow a pattern similar to current Class I differentials although the 
surface is much flatter.  The second scenario, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0, assumes there 
would be no fluid premiums in the absence of federal orders. 
 
These scenarios are run assuming that California makes no changes to its state milk system.  It is 
reasonable to question whether the California system could remain intact with federal order 
elimination, but that effort is left to other rounds of policy analysis.  This assumption helps lead 
to the results shown in Tables 5 and 6.   
 
Table 5 shows that the largest negative price effects on milk occur in the first few years of the 
analysis.  Once supply adjustment occurs, milk prices return closer to levels found before federal 
order elimination.  Fluid consumption rises 2.5 percent as federal orders are eliminated. 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
Milk Cows (thou. head)
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 9,003   8,896   8,831   8,784   8,744   8,713   8,688   8,668   8,652   8,639   8,851          8,672          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO 8,969   8,828   8,768   8,724   8,686   8,655   8,631   8,611   8,594   8,581   8,795          8,614          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 8,953   8,797   8,743   8,700   8,665   8,636   8,612   8,593   8,576   8,563   8,772          8,596          
Milk Production (bil. lbs.)
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 169.5   170.3   171.8   173.4   175.0   176.7   178.5   180.3   182.1   184.0   172.0          180.3          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO 168.7   168.7   170.7   172.4   174.0   175.8   177.6   179.4   181.2   183.1   170.9          179.4          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 168.3   168.1   170.4   172.0   173.7   175.5   177.4   179.2   181.1   182.9   170.5          179.2          
All Milk Price ($/cwt.)
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 12.04   12.15   12.55   12.64   12.64   12.70   12.73   12.80   12.90   12.98   12.40          12.82          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO 11.57   11.63   12.53   12.62   12.60   12.65   12.69   12.76   12.87   12.95   12.19          12.79          
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 11.35   11.42   12.59   12.62   12.63   12.67   12.70   12.77   12.88   12.97   12.12          12.80          
Fluid Milk Consumption (lbs.)
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 208      208      207      206      205      204      204      203      203      203      207             203             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO 211      212      209      209      208      207      206      206      205      205      210             206             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 213      213      210      209      208      208      207      206      206      206      211             207             
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP - Eliminate the MILC program, price support program and DEIP on 1/1/2003, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO - In addition to the 
     previous programs eliminated, eliminate FMMOs 1/1/2003, allow for fluid milk premiums, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 - Identical to NoFMMO 
    except have zero fluid premiums
Table 5. Summary of the Impact of Alternative Federal Milk Market Order Options on the U.S. Dairy Sector
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The result on the U.S. all milk price of these alternatives needs further discussion.  The FAPRI 
model calculates the U.S. all milk price as a current production weighted average of the state-
level all milk prices.  The result of constructing the U.S. all milk price in this fashion is that if the 
production effect of policy changes on a low all milk price state like California is positive then 
the California all milk price will get a larger weight and that will have a negative effect on the 
U.S. all milk price.  This result occurs in these scenarios. 
 
Table 6 shows that the state-level results of these federal order elimination scenarios are not 
uniform across the country.  It appears that states with less than 20 percent fluid utilization show 
higher all milk prices with the elimination of federal orders while those states with fluid 
utilization in excess of 35 percent clearly are better off with the federal order system in place.  
Again, it is important to note that no change was made to the California order system and that 
they are much better off under the elimination of federal orders because as dairy product prices 
increase all of their class prices adjust upward as well. 
  
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (All Milk Price)
California 10.71 10.83 11.24 11.34 11.35 11.42 11.45 11.53 11.63 11.71 11.09 11.55
Wisconsin 12.27 12.41 12.81 12.92 12.94 13.01 13.06 13.15 13.26 13.36 12.67 13.17
New York 12.71 12.85 13.26 13.36 13.37 13.45 13.49 13.57 13.68 13.77 13.11 13.59
Pennsylvania 13.64 13.78 14.19 14.30 14.31 14.38 14.42 14.50 14.61 14.70 14.04 14.53
Minnesota 12.34 12.48 12.88 12.99 13.01 13.09 13.13 13.22 13.34 13.44 12.74 13.24
Idaho 11.30 11.44 11.85 11.95 11.97 12.04 12.08 12.16 12.27 12.36 11.70 12.18
New Mexico 11.68 11.82 12.23 12.34 12.35 12.43 12.47 12.56 12.67 12.76 12.09 12.58
Michigan 12.13 12.27 12.67 12.78 12.79 12.87 12.91 13.00 13.11 13.21 12.53 13.02
Washington 11.99 12.12 12.53 12.64 12.64 12.72 12.75 12.83 12.93 13.02 12.38 12.85
Texas 12.73 12.87 13.28 13.38 13.40 13.47 13.52 13.60 13.71 13.81 13.13 13.62
Other States 12.46 12.59 13.00 13.11 13.12 13.20 13.24 13.32 13.43 13.53 12.86 13.34
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (∆ in All Milk Price Relative to NoMILC/CCC/DEIP)
California 0.23 0.19 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.48 0.67
Wisconsin -0.32 -0.40 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.05
New York -1.03 -1.10 -0.60 -0.60 -0.62 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.79 -0.63
Pennsylvania -1.01 -1.07 -0.57 -0.58 -0.59 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.76 -0.61
Minnesota -0.27 -0.35 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 -0.03 0.10
Idaho -0.17 -0.24 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.07 0.23
New Mexico -1.02 -1.09 -0.58 -0.59 -0.61 -0.63 -0.62 -0.63 -0.63 -0.64 -0.78 -0.63
Michigan -0.60 -0.68 -0.17 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.36 -0.22
Washington -0.16 -0.22 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.08 0.26
Texas -1.03 -1.10 -0.59 -0.60 -0.62 -0.64 -0.63 -0.64 -0.65 -0.65 -0.79 -0.64
Other States -0.73 -0.80 -0.30 -0.30 -0.32 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.49 -0.34
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (∆ in All Milk Price Relative to NoMILC/CCC/DEIP)
California 0.26 0.23 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.66 0.91
Wisconsin -0.45 -0.51 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 -0.06 0.15
New York -1.38 -1.43 -0.66 -0.73 -0.72 -0.75 -0.75 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.98 -0.75
Pennsylvania -1.35 -1.40 -0.63 -0.70 -0.69 -0.72 -0.72 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.96 -0.73
Minnesota -0.38 -0.44 0.34 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.22
Idaho -0.28 -0.33 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.12 0.34
New Mexico -1.41 -1.46 -0.69 -0.76 -0.75 -0.78 -0.79 -0.80 -0.81 -0.81 -1.01 -0.80
Michigan -0.83 -0.88 -0.11 -0.18 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.43 -0.22
Washington -0.30 -0.34 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.10 0.34
Texas -1.52 -1.57 -0.80 -0.87 -0.86 -0.89 -0.90 -0.91 -0.91 -0.92 -1.12 -0.91
Other States -1.16 -1.21 -0.44 -0.51 -0.50 -0.53 -0.54 -0.55 -0.55 -0.56 -0.77 -0.54
NoMILC/CCC/DEIP - Eliminate the MILC program, price support program and DEIP on 1/1/2003, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO - In addition to the 
     previous programs eliminated, eliminate FMMOs 1/1/2003, allow for fluid milk premiums, NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 - Identical to NoFMMO 
    except have zero fluid premiums
Table 6. The Regional Impact on Milk Prices of Alternative Federal Milk Market Order Options
($/cwt.)
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Summary 
 
 
The combined effect of eliminating all of the federal dairy policies examined in this paper results 
in less milk being produced in the United States.  The short run disruption of eliminating features 
of dairy policy generally results in the largest decline in milk prices.  Table 7 highlights that the 
longer run effect on milk prices or milk revenue in the case of a direct payment program is often 
less as milk supplies adjust to the changed policy.  U.S. milk production declines by over 2 
billion pounds in this analysis with the elimination of federal orders with no market generated 
fluid premiums, price support program, DEIP, and the MILC program. 
 
This analysis highlights the reason regional battles have occurred as new dairy policy is debated.  
The impacts of eliminating the MILC program or the federal order system are not uniform across 
states.  It appears from this analysis that the regional dairy battles that occur in the dairy policy 
debate are not over. 
 
This analysis is meant to quantify the “corners” of dairy policy alternatives.  It is an attempt to 
show how the industry would look under these different elimination scenarios.  Each of these 
scenarios required assumptions to be made that can lead to particular results.  A different set of 
assumptions could generate results that look quite different.  The model used to judge these 
policy alternatives can be called into question when such large policy changes are made.  The 
FAPRI model is always being examined to make changes to its structure to better deal with the 
kinds of questions that are being asked of it.  These results are meant to help frame the dairy 
policy debate in quantitative terms.  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 03-07 Ave. 08-12 Ave.
Milk Production (bil. lbs.) 171.2   172.8   174.5   175.4   176.7   178.4   180.0   181.7   183.5   185.2   174.1            181.8            
   MILC (0.0)      (0.0)      (0.0)      0.8       1.1       1.3       1.4       1.5       1.5       1.5       0.4                1.4                
   MILC+ 0.8       1.1       1.3       2.3       2.7       2.9       3.1       3.2       3.2       3.1       1.6                3.1                
   NoMILC (0.9)      (1.2)      (1.3)      (0.7)      (0.4)      (0.3)      (0.2)      (0.1)      (0.1)      (0.1)      (0.9)               (0.2)               
   NoMILC/CCC (1.7)      (2.6)      (2.1)      (1.2)      (0.8)      (0.6)      (0.5)      (0.3)      (0.2)      (0.1)      (1.7)               (0.4)               
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (1.7)      (2.6)      (2.7)      (2.0)      (1.8)      (1.7)      (1.5)      (1.4)      (1.3)      (1.2)      (2.1)               (1.4)               
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (2.5)      (4.1)      (3.8)      (3.0)      (2.7)      (2.6)      (2.4)      (2.3)      (2.2)      (2.1)      (3.2)               (2.3)               
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (3.0)      (4.7)      (4.1)      (3.3)      (3.0)      (2.8)      (2.7)      (2.5)      (2.4)      (2.3)      (3.6)               (2.5)               
All Milk Price ($/cwt.) 12.19   12.24   12.27   12.52   12.58   12.71   12.73   12.81   12.91   13.00   12.36            12.83            
   MILC (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.24)    (0.36)    (0.43)    (0.47)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.12)             (0.48)             
   MILC+ (0.23)    (0.35)    (0.42)    (0.72)    (0.88)    (0.97)    (1.03)    (1.06)    (1.06)    (1.05)    (0.52)             (1.04)             
   NoMILC 0.25     0.37     0.44     0.23     0.15     0.10     0.07     0.04     0.03     0.02     0.29              0.05              
   NoMILC/CCC (0.16)    (0.09)    0.56     0.34     0.22     0.13     0.09     0.08     0.07     0.06     0.18              0.09              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (0.16)    (0.09)    0.28     0.12     0.05     (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.02)    0.04              (0.01)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (0.62)    (0.61)    0.26     0.10     0.02     (0.06)    (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.17)             (0.05)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (0.85)    (0.82)    0.32     0.10     0.05     (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.24)             (0.04)             
MILC Payment ($/cwt.) a/ 1.22     1.18     1.16     -       -       -       -       -       -       -       0.71              -                
   MILC 0.00     0.00     0.00     1.15     1.17     1.13     1.13     1.10     1.05     1.00     0.46              1.08              
   MILC+ 0.10     0.15     0.18     1.35     1.39     1.36     1.37     1.34     1.29     1.23     0.63              1.32              
   NoMILC (1.22)    (1.18)    (1.16)    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       (0.71)             -                
   NoMILC/CCC (1.22)    (1.18)    (1.16)    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       (0.71)             -                
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (1.22)    (1.18)    (1.16)    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       (0.71)             -                
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (1.22)    (1.18)    (1.16)    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       (0.71)             -                
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (1.22)    (1.18)    (1.16)    -       -       -       -       -       -       -       (0.71)             -                
Net Milk Revenue ($/cwt.) b/ 12.91   12.93   12.95   12.52   12.58   12.71   12.73   12.81   12.91   13.00   12.78            12.83            
   MILC (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    0.43     0.32     0.23     0.19     0.15     0.11     0.08     0.15              0.15              
   MILC+ 0.37     0.29     0.24     0.63     0.51     0.39     0.34     0.28     0.22     0.18     0.41              0.28              
   NoMILC (0.46)    (0.32)    (0.24)    0.23     0.15     0.10     0.07     0.04     0.03     0.02     (0.13)             0.05              
   NoMILC/CCC (1.38)    (1.27)    (0.60)    0.34     0.22     0.13     0.09     0.08     0.07     0.06     (0.54)             0.09              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (1.38)    (1.27)    (0.89)    0.12     0.05     (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.67)             (0.01)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (1.84)    (1.79)    (0.91)    0.10     0.02     (0.06)    (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.88)             (0.05)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (2.06)    (2.00)    (0.85)    0.10     0.05     (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.95)             (0.04)             
Cheese Price ($/lb.) 1.25     1.25     1.26     1.28     1.29     1.30     1.30     1.31     1.33     1.34     1.27              1.32              
   MILC (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.01)             (0.04)             
   MILC+ (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.04)             (0.08)             
   NoMILC 0.02     0.03     0.04     0.02     0.01     0.01     0.01     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.02              0.00              
   NoMILC/CCC (0.03)    (0.02)    0.04     0.02     0.02     0.01     0.00     0.00     0.01     0.01     0.01              0.01              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (0.03)    (0.02)    0.01     0.00     (0.00)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.00)    (0.01)             (0.01)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (0.01)    (0.00)    0.07     0.06     0.06     0.05     0.05     0.06     0.06     0.06     0.04              0.06              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (0.01)    (0.00)    0.10     0.09     0.08     0.07     0.08     0.08     0.08     0.08     0.05              0.08              
Butter Price ($/lb.) 1.19     1.25     1.26     1.33     1.35     1.38     1.39     1.40     1.42     1.43     1.28              1.40              
   MILC (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.13)    (0.14)    (0.15)    (0.15)    (0.15)    (0.04)             (0.14)             
   MILC+ (0.07)    (0.10)    (0.12)    (0.21)    (0.25)    (0.28)    (0.29)    (0.30)    (0.31)    (0.30)    (0.15)             (0.30)             
   NoMILC 0.08     0.11     0.13     0.07     0.05     0.03     0.02     0.02     0.01     0.01     0.09              0.02              
   NoMILC/CCC 0.32     0.28     0.24     0.17     0.12     0.11     0.09     0.06     0.03     0.00     0.22              0.06              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP 0.32     0.28     0.27     0.20     0.16     0.15     0.14     0.11     0.09     0.06     0.24              0.11              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO 0.37     0.27     0.26     0.20     0.16     0.14     0.14     0.11     0.08     0.06     0.25              0.10              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 0.38     0.32     0.30     0.21     0.20     0.17     0.17     0.14     0.12     0.09     0.28              0.14              
Nonfat Dry Milk Price ($/lb.) 0.84     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.81     0.82              0.81              
   MILC 0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00              0.00              
   MILC+ 0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00              0.00              
   NoMILC (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)             (0.00)             
   NoMILC/CCC (0.17)    (0.14)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.00)    0.01     (0.08)             (0.01)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP (0.17)    (0.14)    (0.09)    (0.08)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.06)    (0.05)    (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.11)             (0.05)             
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO (0.16)    (0.11)    0.01     0.01     0.02     0.02     0.02     0.03     0.05     0.06     (0.05)             0.04              
   NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 (0.16)    (0.13)    0.03     0.03     0.04     0.03     0.04     0.05     0.06     0.08     (0.04)             0.05              
Baseline - FAPRI March 2003 Baseline, MILC - Extend current MILC program through 2012, MILC+ - Extend MILC program through 2012 and pay
     on all milk marketed, No MILC - Eliminate the current MILC program 1/1/2003, NoMILC/CCC - Eliminate the price support program 1/1/2003 in 
     addtion to MILC elimination,  NoMILC/CCC/DEIP - Eliminate the price support program and the DEIP 1/1/2003 in addtion to MILC elimination, 
     NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO - In addition to the previous programs eliminated, eliminate FMMOs 1/1/2003, allow for fluid milk premiums,  
     NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO0 - Identical to NoMILC/CCC/DEIP/FMMO except have zero fluid premiums
a/ - Payment rate on eligible milk
b/ - Net revenue on all milk produced
Table 7. Summary of the Effects of Removing Federal Dairy Policy on the U.S. Dairy Sector
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